Introduction
The average worker in the United States spends between one fifth and one quarter of his life in retirement. While in retirement, he receives income from a number of sources, with around 20 percent coming from pension income. With the risk of a twenty percent income shock, we should expect individuals to weigh this pension investment choice very carefully. What we observe empirically is that employees, on average, invest a large portion of their pension savings back into company stock 1 . For instance, employees of Pfizer, Inc. invest almost 90 percent of pension assets into Pfizer common stock. This is a questionable asset allocation for two reasons. First, in most retirement plans there a number of investment alternatives beside company stock, including diversified stock funds and bond funds 2 . Portfolio theory suggests a diversified portfolio (free of the idiosyncratic risk associated with a single stock) would dominate a portfolio concentrated in one security. Second, employees of the firm also receive a large portion of their wealth from labor income. With labor income likely related to the success of the firm, the employees take on additional risk by tying labor income and retirement income to the same source of variation 3 .
The large proportion of employee pension wealth invested in own company stock is a portfolio selection puzzle. My hypothesis is that workers' company loyalty helps explain these investment patterns. I define loyalty broadly in the sense of an emotional tie 4 . The question then arises of how to measure loyalty. The same problems inherent in measuring quantities such as utility arise in measuring loyalty. We cannot observe preferences or see their properties (such as level of risk aversion). What we can observe are measures like prices and investor holdings from which we can make inferences about risk aversion and utility. In the same way, loyalty has observable implications on behavior. For instance, we observe fans willing to pay a high premium for the (inherently valueless) icon of their favorite baseball team on an otherwise ordinary cap. Further, loyalty makes observable implications on portfolio choice. In the case that employees form company loyalty at the division level, an hypothesis I motivate in Section 2, I am able to test specific implications of loyalty on portfolio choice. Specifically, I assume stand alone and conglomerate employees are, ceteris paribus, equally loyal to their division. I then exploit a difference stemming from the statutory requirements of 401(k) and security reporting for stand 1 In addition, for over half the 401(k) participants these 401(k) investments weighted heavily in company stock are their sole financial investments (Blake, Elton, and Gruber(2004) ). 2 For instance, in the Pfizer Plan, there are five other options including a diversified stock fund and a fixed income fund. 3 Both of these sources of underdiversification, i.) idiosyncratic risk and ii.) labor income correlated with company, will be considered in Section VII, when the costs of employees investing in company stock are quantified. 4 This definition will be refined in Section 2.
alone and conglomerates. In 401(k) plans, stand alone employees can invest directly in their single segment through company stock, while conglomerate employees must invest in the stock of the entire firm, which includes all "foreign" segments along with their segment. Conglomerate employees may then have a diluted loyalty to the entire firm relative to stand alone employees, and so loyalty based investment would predict that conglomerate employees will invest less in company stock than stand alone employees. I find that, controlling for other firm and plan characteristics, employees of stand alone firms invest as much as 11 percent more in company stock in their 401(k) retirement plans than do conglomerate employees. This represents over a 75 percent increase from the average conglomerate employee investment in the sample.
There are alternative explanations to the this employee investment behavior. I consider two main categories which I will call traditional and non-standard explanations. The first traditional explanation is diversification against labor income. As implied by simple risk diversification against labor income, assuming a part of income is determined at the segment level 5 , employees of conglomerate firms should be willing to invest a larger percentage of contributions into company stock than employees of stand alones. This is due to the "coinsurance" effect of foreign divisions on the variation in company stock. Thus, the result that controlling for other characteristics, stand alone employees invest significantly more in company stock is odds with this hypothesis. As well, the results below regarding union investing and hourly worker investing do not appear consistent with this explanation. An alternative traditional explanation is an information-based approach. This hypothesis is that employees invest large percentages in company stock because they have superior information relative to other investors about the company. To explain the above employee behavior, it must be that there is a larger amount, or better quality, of superior information held by stand alone relative to conglomerate employees. In contrast to this, I find that conglomerate employees have no market timing ability, while stand alone employees in fact exhibit negative market timing (buy before downturns and sell before upturns).
The first non-standard explanation is that employees invest in company stock based on excessive extrapolation of past returns 6 (Benartzi (2001) ). He finds that in a sample of S&P 500 firms, differences in past returns help to explain differences in percentage allocated to company stock among firms. Past returns, however, cannot explain the difference in company stock allocations between stand alone and conglomerate employees. An alternative non-standard explanation is that of perceived information, or familiarity (Huberman (2001) ). This is the most difficult to separate, both conceptually and empirically, from loyalty. A familiarity explanation of the result would be that stand alone employees merely believe that they have a larger amount of superior information than do conglomerate employees, and invest according to this level of perceived information. I test a number of forms of this hypothesis versus loyalty in Section 6 and Section 7, and find support for loyalty. The paper also uses variation in characteristics within stand alone and conglomerate firms, and between employees of the same firm, as proxies for loyalty. Advertising is one way in which a firm can increase it's outside exposure to employees, and so generate pride and loyalty externally. Thus, firms that advertise more, should have more loyal employees, and so employees that invest more in company stock. I find this to be the case, firms that advertise more heavily have employees that invest a significantly larger percentage in company stock. Controlling for other firm characteristics, a two standard deviation move in advertising expenditures results in more than an 8 percent increase in company stock allocations.
One reason that labor unions develop is to provide a mechanism for employees to present discrepancies against the company. Union members may therefore, by self-selection, be expected to be those employees that have less of a tie to the firm, and so invest less in company stock. As well, a union's ability to collectively bargain is jeopardized when members of the union are too loyal to the firm, and thus a successful (observable) union may be that in which employees are less loyal to the company. Consistent with this, union members invest significantly less in company stock (about 6 percent less) than non-union employees.
It is reasonable that the amount of exposure employees have to their firm may affect their company loyalty. Hourly workers, who are presumably more transient, are workers that have had less time and exposure through which to build an emotional tie to the firm, and thus would be expected to be less loyal to the firm. I find that, consistent with this, controlling for other firm characteristics hourly workers invest significantly less (5 percent less) than salaried workers in company stock.
When employees have a longer time to build to a tie to their firm, they have more loyalty to the their company. I use the tenure of the CEO in this position, and the CEO's tenure with the company, to proxy for length of time over which the firm has been under one regime, and so which the employees have had a stable entity to which they could form a tie. Controlling for other firm characteristics, the longer a CEO has spent at a firm, the more the firms employees are willing to invest in company stock. A two standard deviation increase in the tenure of the CEO, increases amount invested in company stock by 4 percent. I further test this by looking at the shock to employee loyalty when a CEO leaves the firm. Often times, CEO departures are concurrent with large changes in the firm (including divestitures and employee firings), which may as well decrease employee loyalty. Consistent with this, when a CEO leaves the firm, the firms' employees investment in company stock decreases significantly (by about 4 percent).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 further develops the notion of company loyalty and establishes loyalty to segment as a frame for this. Section 3 describes the main data sets used. Section 4 gives the main empirical findings for loyalty based portfolio selection by employees, while Section 5 tests alternative explanations of these results. Section 6 gives additional evidence in favor of loyalty based investment by employees, and estimates a possible benefit to the firms of having loyal employees. Section 7 concludes.
Loyalty
There is a developed body of research in Social Psychology regarding both how loyalty develops, and its manifestation in a group. In particular, arbitrary social categorizations into such mundane categories as "us" and "them" result in feelings of in-group favoritism and outgroup discrimination (Brown(1995) , Rabbie and Horwitz (1969) , Tajfel and Turner (1986) ). The general format of the experiments 7 is to classify subjects into arbitrary groups, based on few or no distinguishing group factors. The subjects are then asked to evaluate their in-group and the out-group on a number of characteristics (ex. intelligence, creativity, ability to work well together, etc.). Almost uniformly, they associate positive valence characteristics with their group (in-group), and negative with the out-group (Mummendey, Otten, Berger, and Kessler (2000) ).
In addition, the association happens extremely quickly and somewhat "automatically", minutes after being assigned to the arbitrary social group (Otten and Wentura (1999)). The experiments in Social Psychology find strong evidence for emotional effects of loyalty. A different, but complementary, question is how these emotions are then translated into individual behavior. Loyalty could enter into behavior in two distinct ways (Palacios-Huerta and Santos (2002), Morse and Shive (2003) ). The two mechanisms, both through individual choice, can be seen using the example of investing in company stock.
First, an individual could actually have a utility gain from being loyal, so that loyalty is an argument inside the utility function. In this case, the employee holds company stock, not because he truly believes that his company is "better" than other companies, or will have superior performance to these companies in the future. Instead, the employee gets utility out of building this emotional tie to the firm, in holding company stock.
The second way in which loyalty could enter the choice problem is through the probability estimates. In this case, the individual incorrectly estimates the probability of a certain event because of loyalty associated with the event. Here, the employee holds company stock because he truly believes that his company is better, and will perform better, than other companies. In essence, the employee has overestimated the probability of good states of the world for his company (or alternatively underestimated the bad states) due to his loyalty to the firm. The employee thus gets no utility from holding company stock, but instead has an inflated expected utility due to the loyalty biasing his probability forecasts.
In both mechanisms of loyalty affecting choice, loyalty can raise the expected utility from a certain event or action. Thus, the individual may undertake actions, or make choices, not otherwise made without loyalty. In the case of company stock, the employee may choose to hold company stock even with the associated large costs of underdiversification. The projected benefits of either i.) increased expected utility from the emotional tie of being loyal and holding company stock, or ii.) increased expected utility from the incorrectly estimated probabilities of superior company performance, may outweigh the costs of underdiversification. In this paper, I will not try to distinguish between the two mechanisms of loyalty. I do, however, think that it is important to distinguish between the two. The reason is that any policy aimed at correcting a bias caused by loyalty must take into account which of the two mechanisms above is causing it. Depending on the mechanism of loyalty, the policy implications can be drastically different.
I will examine loyalty's implications for employee investment, and so need to establish the link between loyalty and employee investment: loyalty to company. From the Social Psychology evidence presented above, individuals seem to develop loyalty quite quickly, even to arbitrary social groupings. This loyalty increases with familiarity to the group and contact with the social group (Perdue, Dovido, Gurtman, and Tyler (1990) ). With regards to this, the workplace is often one of individual's most familiar, and relevant, social groupings 8 . As a social group, members of the workplace are often second only to an employee's own family in terms of length of interaction time. The firm may then be a quite natural entity to which individuals develop loyalty. The question arises as to what, within the firm, employees will form loyalty to. Subjects seem to have more loyalty to groups they spend more time with, and to groups about which they have more knowledge (ex. family) (Perdue, Dovido, Gurtman, and Tyler (1990)). As it is almost by necessity that employees have as much or more contact with their segment than with the entire firm, employees might be expected to form loyalty at the segment level. For stand alone employees, the two are synonymous, so loyalty to the segment and firm are the same. The difference arises with conglomerate employees. In a conglomerate, when employees form loyalty to their segment, this does not translate into equal loyalty to the firm. As individuals form weaker ties with groups to which they are less familiar and have less contact, conglomerate employees would be expected to form weaker ties with the "foreign" segments of their firm. Their loyalty to the entire firm, a combination of the loyalty to each segment, would thus be weaker than to their segment. Therefore, compare a stand alone employee and a conglomerate employee, each with the same tie, or loyalty, to their segment. The conglomerate employee will have a weaker tie to the entire firm, diluted by the less strong loyalty to the "foreign" segments of his firm.
In the case loyalty is driving employee investment into own company stock, the prediction is clear: employees of conglomerate firms should invest a smaller percentage in company stock than stand alone employees. An example illustrating this follows.
Consider two employees, one that works for Delta Airlines and one that works for Taco Bell. Assume they have both been working at the companies the same number of years, have had equally as many positive experiences, and are equally loyal to these segments. When the employee for Delta Airlines receives his 401(k) plan document, he is able to invest directly into Delta airlines, a single segment firm. Contrast this with the employee of Taco Bell. When he receives his plan document he cannot invest directly into Taco Bell. Taco Bell (until recently) was owned by Pepsi, Co., and so the employee had the option only to invest in Pepsi common stock. Beside Taco Bell, Pepsi was comprised of segments such as Pepsi Bottling Co., and industry competitors Kentucky Fried Chicken and Pizza Hut. Thus, for this employee to invest the same amount in own company stock as the Delta employee, he must be just as loyal to a bottling company (different industry) and to his industry competitors, as he is to his segment, Taco Bell. In the likely case that the employee does not have as strong a tie to these "foreign" segments, he will have a diluted loyalty to Pepsi, Co. as a whole. Therefore, even though both employees were equally as satisfied and loyal to their segments, the employee of Delta Airlines will invest more in company stock than the employee of Taco Bell.
Data

401(k) Plans -Benefits and Misconceptions
The main data used in this paper are employee withholdings of income into company owned retirement plans. These data are obtained from form 11-k filings to the SEC. A further description of the form 11-k, and accompanying regulations, is provided in Appendix A. The main benefit associated with 401(k) retirement savings plans is that employees can contribute pretax income to the plan. In this way, employees can defer tax on both income and investment appreciation until the money is withdrawn from the plan 9 . Another benefit offered by most plans is a company match. The match is usually given as a percentage of employee contributions (up to a set limit), and is given in one of two ways, i.) all in company stock, or ii.) following participant contributions. In either case, the match can be seen as an immediate "guaranteed" return on investment. For example, consider a plan where the employee contributes 10 to the plan and the employer makes a matching contribution of 2. The employee has at time 0, prior to any investment choice, attained a 20 percent return 10 .
There are a number of misconceptions as to the driving factors for employee investment into own company stock in 401(k) plans. These largely stem from regulation confusions between these and other related company plans. The first misconception is that company stock is offered at a discount, which induces employees to buy large amounts of it. 401(k) plans do not offer company stock at a discount. These discount plans are called Employee Stock Purchase Plans (E.S.P.P.). There are no E.S.P.P.s included in my sample, so my results are not dependent on these. The second aspect of these plans that is not driving my results is something I call a "bonus match." This a policy that the company will match an employee by a larger amount, in the case the employee chooses to invest in own company stock 11 . I exclude plans that have this bonus match feature from my sample. A third misconstrued belief is that company pressure forces employees to invest their 401(k) contributions into company stock. Almost all 401(k) plans are run nearly completely through what is called a plan custodian. For example, a firm may outsource operation of the plan to Fidelity. All trades and allocation decisions are done through the custodian. Thus, when an employee decides to invest more or less in company stock, he would call Fidelity to change this allocation. It is very unlikely that the company ever sees individual data on retirement contributions by employee. A main reason for outsourcing is to circumvent dealing with this more cumbersome running of the plan. A final misconception is that the large percentage seen invested in company stock does not represent the average worker's account, but instead is just an artifact of the huge top management retirement accounts heavily tilted toward company stock 12 . This is not the case. In fact, the participation requirements set out in Section 401 require a salary cap to be imposed (determined annually by the I.R.S.) for eligible income in the plan. Specifically, under Section 401(a)-17(A), for a defined contribution plan to be "qualified" (receive preferential tax treatment) employees above a predefined salary level can only contribute a maximum set amount. Over these sample years, no individual can contribute more than 10,000 dollars per year, regardless of income 13 .
Dataset and Methodology
The paper uses a unique database of 11-k filings of stand alone and conglomerate firms that I hand-collected from the SEC online database of company filings 14 . Stand alone firms and conglomerate firms are defined as those firms that report a single segment and multiple segments, respectively 15 , which are determined using the COMPUSTAT Industrial Segment database. This reporting stems from Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 14, which requires firms to report material segment information in different four-digit SIC code industries. If an industry segment accounts for more than 10 percent of identifiable assets, total revenues, or operating income, the firm is required to report a subset of accounting variables separately for the segment (Whited (2001)). My main sample spans 1997-2000, and I give a representative summary of the sample selection procedure of 11-k filings used for 2000. I first gathered data on all firms reporting on COMPUSTAT Industrial Segment database for the year 2000. There were 1,319 single segment and 4,310 multiple segment firms. I matched each stand alone firm COMPUSTAT listing against its listing with the SEC forms filed in 2001. This had to be done firm by firm, as there is no natural link variable between COMPUSTAT's listing and the SEC listing of a firm. Of the 1,319 single segment firms listed in COMPUSTAT, 73 filed an 11-k. For the conglomerate firm sample, because of the time involved matching on a firm by firm basis, I chose a random sub-sample in order to try to match the empirical percentage of conglomerate to stand alone firms (roughly 77 percent conglomerate and 23 percent stand alone firms). Of the 1,833 multiple segment firms I sampled, 274 had 11-k filings, representing 357 segment 11-k filings. An important point is that this does not represent all segments of the 274 firms, as employee contributions is not one of the signalling purposes than that of the average worker. 13 Additional sections of the Internal Revenue Code that deal with this issue are Section 416(G)-1 and 410(b)-1. Both limit the participation, and benefits, of the plan received by key employees and management.
14 http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar 15 I define segments as business segments.
variables required to be separately reported by firms 16 . I then omit 11-k forms filed for employee stock ownership plans, and forms that were filed for joint E.S.O.P.-401(k) plans. Also omitted are those firms that began offering company stock as an option in the last quarter or last half of 2000 (non-company stock plans), and plans that offer a bonus match provision in own company stock.
The main variable of interest from the statements is percentage of employee contributions in company stock. In the form 11-k, firms are required to report the amount of plan assets in each investment option. In addition, in the 1997-1998 sample, firms also segregated yearly flows into the amount of flow going into each investment option 17 . For 1997-1998, I use this annual segregated data, and for 1999-2000, I estimate it. I have information on both plan assets and the proportion of plan assets in company stock for all firms, so I use the following two simple measures to estimate discretionary contribution to company stock for 1999-2000. When employer match follows participant investment
when the employer match is in company stock
where T is the estimate of discretionary contribution percentage invested in company stock, C is amount in company stock, P is total plan assets, and M is the annual percentage match by employer. Both measures incorporate the accumulation of past contributions and past returns in their calculation. The incorporation of past returns causes the second measure to give negative estimates of T for some firms. These firm estimates are omitted from the sample. To check the efficacy of this estimation, I use the same procedure on the 1997-1998 data. I then compare the estimates with the actual data for that sample period. I find that the correlation between estimates and actual is quite high, .81 for conglomerate firms and .92 for stand alones, lending support to the estimation procedure 18 . Another interesting aspect of the data is that employees allocation percentage to company stock changes slowly over time (average correlation of about .9 from year to year). This could be due in part to slowly changing preferences, but also in part to an effect consistent with Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) , in which employees forget to rebalance their portfolios (Madrian and Shea (2001)).
Employee and Plan Characteristics
Firm and plan characteristics are in Table 1 , Panel A. As expected, conglomerate firms are on average larger firms with larger retirement plans, as both average ME and total plan assets are over three times those for stand alones. One piece of information provided by the 11-k is the company matching percentage, usually as a certain percentage of employee contributions 19 .
I calculate Maximum Total Match as the maximum (as a percentage of employee income) that the company will match if the employee contributes the maximum percentage of income into the plan (usually 16 percent). This can be seen as the benefit fully invested employees receive in the form of immediate return 20 from the company match. For instance, in stand alone firms, the roughly 4 percent Maximum Total Match represents about a 25 percent match to employee contributions (4/16), and so an average 25 percent immediate return to a fully invested employee. From the table, the percentage of firms that match in company stock (as opposed to following participant's investment choice) is similar across type of firm (27 and 32 percent for stand alone and conglomerate, respectively). This Maximum Total Match is also uncorrelated with whether or not the company matches in company stock 21 . The only significant positive correlation is that companies matching in their own stock have a larger percentage of company stock in plan assets. Characteristics of employees of both types of firms are in Panel B of Table 1 . I collect data on the number of plan participants (active and inactive) for a subset of firms using the Department of Labor's Form 5500 Tapes. The average annual contribution of employees to the retirement plans of both types of firms is around 3000 dollars. As a percentage of annual income, employees of conglomerate and stand alone firms defer on average 7.9 and 8.2 percent, respectively 22 . Current Contribution/Total Plan Assets, which is the sum of total employee and employer contributions for a given year divided by total plan assets, and Active/Total, the 19 The most common company match was 50 percent of employee contributions on the first 6 percent of income that employees defer into the plan. 20 This "immediate" return is subject to the same restrictions discussed in footnote 9. 21 I calculated separate mean Total Company Matches for firms that do and do not match in company stock, and they were not significantly different. 22 The percent of income deferred by employees is estimated using (total company contribution/total employee contribution) for a given year and the Maximum Total Match of a company. The percentage is thus an upper bound of income contribution percentage by employees.
number of active participants divided by total participants, are both proxies for the age of the retirement plan. Both measures suggest that stand alone and conglomerate firms have offered the sampled defined contribution plans to employees for roughly the same number of years.
Loyalty Based Investment
The main goal of this paper is to document that employees' loyalty plays a role in their investment into own company stock. To do this, I will begin by testing allocations to 401(k) plans of stand alone and conglomerate firm employees. Loyalty works in the opposite direction of portfolio diversification against labor income. Loyalty predicts that employees of the stand alone firms will invest a larger percentage in company stock than employees of conglomerate firms. From Section 2, this is because stand alone employees can invest directly in the division in which they work, and are loyal. Employees of conglomerate firms are forced to invest only in entire company stock. While conglomerate employees can be assumed to share the same loyalty to their division as a stand alone employee 23 , they will have a lower loyalty to foreign segments.
They will then have a diluted loyalty to the company as a whole, and so will be willing to invest a smaller percentage in company stock.
Case Study: Employees of Connecticut Energy
The following example from my sample is representative of a much more systematic trend in employee investment behavior, which I document in the subsequent sections:
In February of 2000, Energy East Corporation purchased and formed a wholly owned subsidiary of Connecticut Energy Co. Energy East was a diversified conglomerate in the energy sector, with businesses in natural gas, propane, and electricity (from sources including nuclear and hydroelectric). Conn. Energy was a focused firm in the distribution of natural gas 24 .
23 Division-level loyalty as a frame is motivated in Section 2. 24 Short descriptions of the main activities of each firm from Thompson Financial are included below. Connecticut Energy Corporation -The principal activity of the group is the retail distribution of natural gas for residential, commercial and industrial uses.
Energy East Corporation -The group's principal activities are carried out through three business segments: electric delivery, natural gas delivery and other segment. Electric delivery segment consists of its regulated electricity transmission, distribution and generation operations in new york and maine. Natural gas delivery segment includes regulated natural gas transportation, storage and distribution operations in new york, connecticut, maine and massachusetts. Other segment includes providing energy services and distribution of natural gas and propane air. The group also generates electricity from its share of a nuclear plant and its several hydroelectric stations.
Upon the merger, both the retirement plan and company stock of Conn. Energy were dissolved (only stock in the parent company Energy East was subsequently traded). The employees of Conn. Energy were given the option to invest the proceeds of their former retirement plan into Energy East company stock or any of the other ten investment options in the Energy East plan. Presumably, the employees now working for a wholly owned subsidiary of a conglomerate should be willing to invest more in company stock. Their labor income is tied to the subsidiary, while company stock reflects the returns of the entire conglomerate. Thus, the former Conn. Energy employees' labor income covaries less with company stock than when in the stand alone. From Panel A of Table 2 , it is seen how the contributions of Conn. Energy employees change in the new plan. Plan 1 and Plan 2 consist of employees that worked in 1999 for Conn. Energy, while Plan 3 consists of employees of Energy East in 1999. The former Conn. Energy employees actually decrease their allocation to company stock by 50 percent to 75 percent post merger, now that "company stock" represents Energy East instead of the more closely tied Conn. Energy. From Plan 3 in the table, pre-merger employees of Energy East do not change their level of company stock at all following the merger, suggesting that the decrease of Conn. Energy employees was not driven by a widely known negative shock to Energy East.
Stand Alone and Conglomerate Investment
Stand alone and conglomerate investment are compared in Panels B and C of Table 3 . Using discretionary contributions from 1997-1998, employees of stand alone firms direct 16.09 percent of their annual contributions into company stock while employees of conglomerate firms direct only 12.24 percent, with the difference of 3.42 percent significant (t = 2.29) at the 5 percent level. This result using the full sample 1997-2000 are 18.06 percent allocated for stand alone firm employees and 12.47 for conglomerate employees, with the difference of 5.59 percent significant (t = 4.39) at the 1 percent level. Panel C separates the data by percentage contributed to company stock to provide further support for the results in Panel B. The companies are first ranked by percentage contributed to company stock and separated into quintiles based on this ranking (1 contains the firms with the largest amount invested in company stock and 5 contains firms with the lowest). The percentages in the table are then percentages of stand alone firms in each quintile. If stand alone and conglomerate firms were evenly distributed across quintiles, the percentage of stand alone firms in each quintile should be about 20 percent (population percentage: 
Regressions 4.3.1 Categorical Variable
The regressions of Table 3 provide the ability to control for other company characteristics that may affect contributions into company stock by employees. The framework also makes it possible to simultaneously test loyalty against other explanations for employee contributions into company stock. The dependent variable in all regression models is employee discretionary contributions into company stock as a percentage of total employee contributions. The main independent variable of interest is a categorical variable for stand alone and conglomerate firms (Stand Alone-Congl). This variable takes a value of one for stand alone plans, and a value of zero for conglomerate firm retirement plans. The coefficient on this variable should measure the increase (decrease) in contributions of employees because they are employed by a stand alone as opposed to a conglomerate firm, controlling for the other variables in the regression. Control variables for firm characteristics included are the logarithm of market equity, the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio, and the logarithm of wage 25 . I also include an employer matching contribution type indicator. This categorical variable, Com Match, is equal to 1 when the company has a policy to make matching contributions into company stock, and 0 when company matches follow participant investment choices. This may capture an endorsement effect. Employees may invest more in company stock when the employer matches in this, merely because they view employer match as implicit investment advice. However, if the employees have an optimal amount of company stock exposure they plan to take, we should see employees investing less of their own discretionary contributions in company stock when the company match is already forced into this investment choice. Additional firm characteristics of beta and standard deviation of past returns are also included in the regressions. These are calculated over both the 12 month, 24 month, and 36 month time horizon. As pension assets make up a fairly large portion of retirement wealth for a number of employees, the variance of company returns may be an important factor in determining allocations to this investment choice.
The prediction of loyalty is that controlling for other characteristics, Stand AloneCongl should be positive. From Table 3 26 , in all models the coefficient is positive and significant.
From the first specification, stand alone employees seem to invest about 7 percent more in company stock than conglomerate employees. When year and industry fixed effects are included along with firm beta and standard deviation of past returns, the difference widens to over 8 percent and becomes even more significant (t = 3.20). This 8 percent increase represents more than a 50 percent increase in allocation to company stock over the average conglomerate employee. This effect thus seems to have a substantial impact on employee investment behavior.
Another consistently significant coefficient is on firm size. I provide evidence in Section 6 that size is proxying for outside exposure to the firm (as better captured by advertising expenditures).
Company stock return volatility does affect employee investment into company stock. The direction, though, is opposite to that expected, as controlling for level of covariance with the market, the higher the variance of company stock returns, the more employees invest into company stock.
As well, consistent with the endorsement effect, and in contrast to employees' choice of a fixed optimal level of company stock exposure, employees increase the amount invested in company stock by about 6 percent, when employers already match in it 27 .
Excessive Extrapolation
It may be the case that employees use past returns to determine future allocations. Specifically, they may use the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)), so that they excessively extrapolate the past returns into predicted future performance. Benartzi (2001) finds that in a sample of S&P 500 firms, differences in past returns help to explain the varying allocations across firms. Thus, it could be that the results in Table 3 are driven by cross-sectional differences in past returns of the firms. To test for this, I include the logarithm of one plus buy and hold past returns for each firm, over a number of time horizons. The results are in Table 4 . All regressions include industry and year fixed effects, with all standard errors clustered at the firm level 28 . From this table, although the effect of extrapolation increases with return period (in line with Benartzi (2001)), excessive extrapolation cannot explain the allocation decisions between stand alone and conglomerate employees. As predicted by loyalty, stand alone employees invest significantly more in company stock than conglomerate employees. In fact, after controlling for the effect of excessive extrapolation, the effect of loyalty is even more pronounced, as now stand alone employees invest almost 11 percent more (t=2.87) into company stock than conglomerate employees (with a ten year past return period).
Herfindahl Indices
A potential problem with the Stand Alone-Congl categorical variable is that it may be too coarse a measure of firm diversification, and so may be misclassifying firms. Consider a firm that has two segments: one that makes up 90 percent of assets and income, and the other makes up 10. This would be classified as a conglomerate firm under Stand Alone-Congl, but the bulk of the employees (those in the 90 percent segment) might be expected to act like stand alone employees. For evidence supporting this, consider the investment of Sara Lee employees: Sara Lee Corp., a food goods manufacturer, owns the relatively much smaller apparel company, Hanes. The employees of Sara Lee Foods invest, on average, about 3 times as much in Sara Lee company stock as the employees in Hanes. So, even though Sara Lee Corp. is a conglomerate, employee contributions of the larger Sara Lee Foods will drive the overall investment by employees into company stock, and the average employee will invest more like a stand alone employee than a conglomerate one.
There is a need, then, for a more continuous measure of firm diversification. I construct two types of measures: The first is number of segments, where segment number proxies for increasing diversification of the firm. Loyalty predicts that this coefficient should be negative; as the number of segments increases, the amount invested by employees in company stock should decrease. The second type of measures that I construct are Herfindahl Indices of diversification within the firm. The COMPUSTAT Segment Database reports data on capital expenditures, sales, employees, and assets stratified by segment within a firm. I use these to create Herfindahl Indices based on each of these measures. An example of the Herfindahl Index for sales is below
For stand alone firms, the Herfindahl Index is equal to one for all measures (ex. employees). As the firm's value becomes more dispersed across the segments, the Index will get closer to zero. Thus, the more dispersed a firm is, the lower its Herfindahl Index value. Loyalty predicts a positive coefficient on the Indices, as a larger Index represents a firm closer to stand alone.
The results of the regressions are in Table 5 . The negative and significant coefficient on segments in the first regression is consistent with the loyalty prediction. The -.009 coefficient means that the average employee of a conglomerate with 8 segments will invest 5 percent less in company stock than the average employee of a 2 segment conglomerate. The coefficients of the Herfindahl Indices are all positive, and are significantly positive for sales and capital expenditures, also supporting the loyalty prediction. The coefficient of .069 on Sales Herfindahl translates into the average employee of a stand alone firm investing 5.5 percent more in company stock than the average employee of a conglomerate firm with 5 segments, all with equal sales. These continuous measures of diversification thus also support the predictions of loyalty.
Diversification Against Labor Income
Loyalty works in the opposite direction of portfolio diversification against labor income. As implied by simple risk diversification against labor income, employees of conglomerate firms should be willing to invest a larger percentage of contributions into company stock than employees of stand alones. This is due to the "coinsurance" effect of foreign divisions on the variation in company stock. In a conglomerate firm, an employee's division (ex. Taco Bell), and so labor income, may experience a negative shock, while the entire firm (ex. Pepsi, Co), and so company stock, may still be doing quite well. In a stand alone this coinsurance does not exist, as the division is synonymous with the firm. Lacking this coinsurance, the stand alone employee should be willing to invest less in company stock than the conglomerate employee. This risk diversification prediction is opposite to the results in Table 2 -Table 5 . As predicted by loyalty, these tables provide evidence that stand alone employees invest significantly more in company stock than conglomerate employees.
Additional Alternative Explanations
Information Hypothesis
The information-based explanation of employee investment in company stock is that employees have superior information about their company relative to other investors, and so are willing to purchase a large percentage of their company stock. For this to explain the investment behavior in Section 4, there must not only be an information asymmetry, but employees of stand alone firms must have access to more (or better) information than employees of conglomerate firms. This would induce them to invest a larger percentage in company stock than employees of conglomerate firms. A problem with both of these information-based explanations is that they focus only on favorable information about companies. If employees truly do have access to superior information about their employing companies, they should be willing to trade on this information, both buying and selling. The data from Section 4 and Section 5 imply instead that employees routinely direct a large percentage of discretionary contributions into company stock. Unless all the companies are consistently performing well, this would not be consistent with an information-based explanation. As a more formal test of this explanation, I test both employees' ability to predict changes in prices over time (returns), and the difference between the predictive ability of conglomerate and stand alone employees. To run the tests, I first collected a time series sub-sample of employee discretionary contribution data from 1992-1996 (where available). I add this to the sample to obtain a sub-sample of firms with data covering part, or all, of 1992-2000.
Panel A of Table 6 measures employees' ability to predict future returns. I use the correlation between percentage change in prices for a given year and the percentage change in the portion of discretionary contributions invested in company stock during the prior year to measure this. The first implication of the information-based explanation is that through superior information employees are able to predict future year returns, so this correlation should be positive. The correlation in Panel A is slightly negative (-.04) indicating that employees as a whole are not using superior information to predict future year returns. Second, and specific to the information-based explanation's ability to make the same predictions as loyalty, this correlation for stand alone employees should be larger than for employees of conglomerate firms. The correlation for employees of conglomerate firms is -.03 while for stand alone employees it is -.38, the exact opposite direction as would be needed. In fact, these correlations imply that while employees of conglomerate firms cannot time the fluctuations in their company stock's return, stand alone employees exhibit negative market timing. Put another way, stand alone employees are actually quite often buying directly before stock price downturns, and selling directly before stock price upturns! Panel B measures another form of the information hypothesis. Here, employees receive their superior information relatively close to the time it will be released, and so must trade on it quickly to exploit it. This allows for the possibility that employees receive and trade on information in the same year. To test this, I use the correlation between change in prices for a given year, and change in discretionary contributions for the same year. If employees do receive and trade on superior information in the same year, then regardless of the inter-year fluctuations of stock price, employees should on average change percentage contributions in the same direction as, and relative to, changes in prices. The correlation for all employees in Panel B is close to zero (.02), indicating that employees are not able to use short term superior information to predict company stock returns. Inconsistent with the information-based explanation of the Section 4 results, employees of conglomerate firms have a "better" timing ability (none as opposed to negative) of their company stock returns. Conglomerates have a correlation of .02, as opposed to again the negative market timing of stand alone employees with a correlation of -.20.
Geographic Familiarity
Familiarity is the most difficult of the alternative explanations to separate conceptually and empirically from loyalty. Preference for the familiar (Heath and Tversky (1990)) predicts that employees will opt to make allocations into investments toward which they are "familiar," or about which they "perceive" they have the most information. In particular, a familiarity explanation in which employees of stand alones are assumed to perceive they know relatively more about the firm than conglomerate employees would produce similar results to those in Section 4. To test between the explanations of familiarity and loyalty, a measure must be found that causes variation in either familiarity or loyalty, without causing variation in the other.
The type of familiarity on which I focus in this section is geographic familiarity. There is evidence that geographic proximity can influence portfolio choice (Huberman (2001) ). The hypothesis is that the closer in physical proximity individuals are to a firm, the larger their perceived information, and so the more they invest in the firm. To test the effect of geographic familiarity, I construct a measure of geographic concentration of firms, domestic exposure, defined as the ratio of domestic sales (provided in the COMPUSTAT geographic segment file) to total sales. I then run the regressions in Table 4 -Table 6 , including this geographic exposure measure. As I control for level of firm diversification, this measure attempts to capture the degree to which the employee is more familiar with other company activities, in a way not related to diversification. The hypothesis is that the employees will be more familiar with the firm's operations if they are concentrated in the local market. In contrast, the level of employee loyalty to other segments of the company is not dependent on the geographic distance between segments (the employee forms loyalty to his segment). The prediction of familiarity is then that the coefficient on Domestic Exposure should be positive and significant, while loyalty predicts that there should be no effect of geographic dispersion after controlling for firm diversification. Panel B of Table 6 shows that the measure of domestic exposure is not different from zero in any of the specifications, as predicted by loyalty and in contrast to familiarity. As well, this familiarity measure does not seem to effect the magnitude or significance of firm diversification on employee's allocation decision.
The caveat of this measure is that ideally segment level zip code information would be obtained to run the test more cleanly. As segment level zip code data is not available, and only data on country of segment is, I create this coarser measure. Although it is a coarse measure, and does not capture within country variation, there is still much evidence that cross country variation has a large effect on investment patterns (Coval and Moskowitz (1999) ). In Section 6, I present further evidence inconsistent with perceived information explanations, and supporting loyalty.
Additional Evidence For Loyalty
This section documents evidence complimentary to that found in Section 4 supporting loyalty in employee investment behavior. The results include cleaner measures of the differences between conglomerate and stand alone employee investment (controlling for employee specific characteristics) and measures of variation in loyalty conditional on the level of firm diversification. As well, one possible benefit to firms of having loyal employees is quantified.
Spin-Off
The spin-off of a segment or subsidiary gives a natural experiment of loyalty's prediction on investment behavior. It provides a cleaner test of the prediction of Section 4, in that the same employees can be followed from conglomerate to stand alone. Although the choice of whether to spin-off is somewhat endogenous, this framework allows me to orthogonalize against systematic differences in employees, as I am following (presumably) the same employees across firm type. In the case that employees in a conglomerate increase percentage invested in company stock when their segment is spun-off, this would provide cleaner evidence for loyalty.
I match the database of spin-offs 29 occurring during the sample period to my data set. The cases where both parent firm and spun-off firm match my database are presented in Table 7 . Consistent with the predictions of loyalty, employees do, on average, increase the percentage held in company stock upon being spun-off into a stand alone firm. In fact, the increase is substantial, with the average employee increasing percentage invested in company stock by about 45 percent.
Advertising
A way to test loyalty's implication on employee investment in company stock is to find a measure that captures variation in loyalty. This variation in loyalty should then translate to variation in employee investment in company stock. From the evidence in Social Psychology (detailed in Section 2), one way for firms to generate more loyal employees is to increase employees' contact with the firm. One method by which firms can do this is to increase what I call employees' "outside exposure" or "external exposure" to the firm. Firms can do this by increasing the amount of advertising of the firm. This will increase employees' outside contact with the firm, thus increasing loyalty to the firm. An example illustrating this follows.
Consider two employees, one that works for J&B Cola and one that works for CocaCola, and that the two companies are the same size. J&B Cola, however only serves four private customers, is not sold in retail stores, and does no advertising. When the employee of J&B Cola leaves his firm, he is completely disconnected from J&B Cola. Contrast this with the employee of Coca-Cola. When he leaves work to go to the supermarket, he sees Coca-Cola. When he goes to a restaurant, Coca-Cola is on the menu. He walks down the street and can see Coca-Cola billboards. He watches television, and sees Coca-Cola sponsoring the Olympics, etc. His exposure once leaving the firm allows him to remain in contact with the firm, while the employee of J&B Cola does not. This increased contact will translate into stronger ties of loyalty for the Coca-Cola employee than for the equivalent worker in J&B Cola.
It is true that the effect will be correlated with firm size. However, in the case that the external exposure hypothesis is true, firm size may just be a proxy for this effect. The consistent significance of size in the regressions of Section 4 -Section 6 may reflect the strength of this external exposure.
The variable Advertising is the advertising expenditures by the firm. The prediction of loyalty is that the coefficient on this variable should be positive. As external contact of employees with the firm increases, loyalty increases, causing an increase in percentage invested in company stock. Also, in the case that firm size is merely proxying for external exposure, then when the more direct measure of advertising is included, it should drive out the effect of size on employee contributions into company stock. Table 8 contains these regressions. Controlling for firm characteristics (including level of firm diversification), increased advertising significantly increases employee investment into company stock. A two standard deviation move in advertising expenditures results in more than an 8 percent increase in company stock allocations. This supports the prediction of external exposure's effect on loyalty. In addition, Advertising drives out the effect of size (which was consistently significant in all previous regressions). This lends credence to the hypothesis that size may be merely proxying for external exposure to the firm.
Union Investing
One reason that unions develop is to create a forum to collectively present problems and discrepancies to the company. Union members may therefore, by self-selection, be those employees expected to be less tied to the firm. As well, one way that a union gains power is through its ability to collectively bargain, which hinges on its ability to make credible statements about the actions of its members. This ability is jeopardized when the members of the union are too loyal to the firm, as the members may be reluctant to take actions against the firm because of their loyalty. A "successful" (so existing and observable) union would be one that could effectively curb this loyalty to company. From self-selection and this collective bargaining effect, it is then predicted that union members are less loyal to the firm than non-union members, and so union employees would invest less than non-union employees in company stock.
The risk diversification prediction of union employee investment is the opposite. Most unions provide a number of services to its members, including job search assistance in times of unemployment, and even in some cases direct payments during unemployed periods (much like unemployment insurance). As these benefits are specific to union members, and do not apply to non-union members, the labor income of union members would be somewhat insured by the union. This would cause their labor income stream to be less correlated with the company than non-union employees, and so they should willing to invest a larger percentage in company stock than non-union members.
The familiarity prediction is also different than that of loyalty. Under the assumption that given a certain job, union members work the same hours as non-union members, both sets of employees have equal exposure to the firm 30 . With equal exposure to the firm, it is reasonable that union and non-union members have the same level of perceived information about the firm. Thus, familiarity predicts that union membership should not have an effect on employee investment into own company stock. Some unions bargain separately for retirement plans, and these plans are filed separately by the company. The union plans have roughly equivalent features as the non-union plans of the firm, including matching percentage and company match type (whether or not in company stock). In most cases, the union plans are outsourced through the same plan custodian, and so the investment options are also identical. I define the categorical variable Union, to take a value of one for solely union plans, and zero for all other plans. The predictions of the three explanations above on this coefficient are: loyalty, a positive coefficient, risk diversification, a negative coefficient, and familiarity, a zero value. The regressions are in Table 8 . Controlling for other characteristics (including other sources of loyalty) union members do invest significantly less (about 6 percent less) than non-union members in company stock. This evidence supports the loyalty prediction, and contrasts the other two explanations.
Transient Investing
In addition to filing separate plans for collectively bargaining employees, some firms also file separate plans solely covering hourly workers of the firm. This segregation of employees makes it possible to test the difference in investment patterns between hourly and salaried workers. Hourly workers are often those whose human capital is less specific, and whose labor income is less tied to the firm (ex. clerical workers). From a risk diversification framework, it is exactly these workers who should be most willing to invest in company stock (Poterba (2003) ). However, these are also the employees who are expected to be the most transient, and so who have, on average, the least contact with the firm. The prediction of loyalty is then opposite that of the risk diversification framework. As these more transient employees, on average, have likely developed a weaker to the firm, they should be less loyal. So, they should invest a smaller percentage in company stock than salaried employees.
The plans covering only hourly workers have roughly equivalent features as the other firm plans. I define the categorical variable, Transient, to take a value of one for plans solely covering hourly workers, and zero for all other plans. The regressions are in Table 8 . In support of loyalty's prediction on employee behavior, hourly workers invest significantly less than salaried workers. These transient workers invest, on average, about 5 percent less in company stock than salaried workers.
CEO Tenure and Departures
When employees have a longer time to build a tie to their firm, they may have more loyalty it. Thus, when a firm structure, hierarchy, and management stay constant over a long period of time, this allows employees a longer time over which to build loyalty to the company. To measure this effect, I use the tenure of the CEO in this position (CEO Tenure), and the CEO's tenure with the company (Company Tenure), to proxy for length of time over which the firm has been under one stable regime 31 . Long CEO tenures (and CEO tenures within 31 The data on CEO characteristics is obtained from the COMPUSTAT Execucomp Database.
the company) can also signal CEO loyalty 32 , which may lead other employees to be loyal as well. Thus, loyalty would predict that as employees of firms with a longer history of a stable regime have had more time to grow a tie to it, these employees should invest more in company stock. The regressions are in Table 9 . In support of loyalty's prediction, controlling for other characteristics, an increase in CEO tenure in office (and also tenure in the firm) has a significant effect on the amount employees invest in company stock. A two standard deviation increase in the tenure of the CEO increases amount invested in company stock by 4 percent. Related to the length of time I further test this by looking at the shock to employee loyalty when a CEO leaves the firm. Often times, CEO departures are concurrent with large changes in the firm (including divestitures and employee firings), which may as well decrease employee loyalty. These changes not only change the nature of the firm, but may also be specifically directed to employees (ex. wage decreases and firings). Loyalty would then predict that when the CEO leaves a firm, this is a negative shock to employee loyalty, and so employees will decrease the amount invested in company stock. The regressions are in Table 10 . I define the categorical variable, CEO Departure, to be equal to one in firms whose CEO left that year, and zero otherwise. Consistent with loyalty's prediction, when a CEO leaves the firm, the amount the firm's employees invest in company stock decreases significantly, by about 4 percent 33 . The Execucomp Database also lists reasons for the CEO departure, which it classifies into four categories. These categories are Resigned, Unknown, Retired, and Deceased. Table  10 also includes regressions broken into these characteristics. Although the coefficients are, for most specifications, not distinguishable from each other, an interesting pattern emerges. The only effect which is consistently different from zero in all specifications is when the CEO Resigns. As well, the CEO resigning might be interpreted as the worst signal to the firm's stability of the four reasons. The most exogenous to firm stability of the four reasons is when the CEO passes away while in office 34 . From Table 10 , this has the least distinguishable effect (from zero) on company allocations in all specifications.
Benefit To Firms
It is often exuded that loyal workers are a desirable characteristic and benefit to the firm. This benefit, however, is difficult to quantify. In this section I test for one possible benefit of loyal employees, an effect on wages. When employees have greater loyalty to a firm, 32 This is a noisy signal, as CEO tenure is probably correlated with past performance. I therefore control for past performance in these tests. 33 All of the results in Table 9 and Table 10 hold for all horizons of past returns included. 34 It would be difficult for the firm to plan this, and it is probably fairly exogenous to firm conditions. it may be expected that the firm has more discretion than otherwise in decisions regarding the employees. This is because the employees are more reluctant to sever with the firm because of the stronger ties developed. I find that, controlling for other firm characteristics, the more loyal employees are to a firm, the lower wage the firm needs to pay them 35 . Controlling for other firm characteristics, as the firm gets closer to a stand alone, so has increased employee loyalty, the wage per employee it must pay decreases. For instance, a conglomerate firm that becomes closer to a stand alone by decreasing one of its segments, is able to decrease its wage bill per employee by 387 dollars (t = 5.23). Also, being in a union increases wages significantly. Controlling for other firm characteristics, including variation in loyalty, the increase in union wage is 981 dollars (t = 2.50). This result is consistent with the investment behavior of union employees. Union employees invested significantly less than non-union employees in company stock, and demand relatively higher wages in order to stay with the firm, both possibly consistent with a relative lack of firm loyalty. These results seem to suggest that a tangible benefit of lower wage costs may exist from having more loyal employees. There are difficulties in drawing conclusions from these regressions. First, there is a relatively small sample of firms for which wage expense data is available. Second, there are likely to be a number of other effects affecting wage determination, which may be correlated with the loyalty result found in the table.
An additional benefit to firms may be that having shares held by employees decreases the chances of takeover, by having the shares closely held. Rauh(2004) finds evidence that investment in company stock decreases as probability of takeover decreases.
Conclusion
This paper finds support for loyalty based employee investment in a number of settings. In addition, the results cannot be explained by, and in some cases are even opposite to, that which would be predicted by a traditional risk diversification framework, an information based explanation, or excessive extrapolation of past returns.
The tests in the paper are performed on a unique hand-collected database from firm 11-k filings to the SEC. I exploit the statutory difference that in 401(k) plans stand alone employees can invest directly in their single segment through company stock, while conglomerate employees must invest in the stock of the entire firm, which includes all "foreign" segments. Evidence from Social Psychology suggests loyalty to the firm develop at the divisional level. In 35 These results are not included here, but are available upon request. this framework, conglomerate employees will have a diluted loyalty to the entire company relative to stand alone employees, and therefore loyalty based portfolio choice will predict conglomerate employees invest less in company stock than stand alone employees. I find that controlling for other firm and plan characteristics, employees of stand alone firms invest about 11 percent more in company stock in their 401(k) retirement plans than do conglomerate employees. As the average conglomerate employee in the sample invests about 13 percent in company stock, this represents a substantial difference. This wedge is opposite to that predicted by a risk diversification framework, but is the pattern predicted by loyalty based investment.
I document additional employee investment behavior supporting loyalty. In a cleaner test of the above implication, employees who were part of a conglomerate firm, but then are spun-off into a stand alone, undertake a 45 percent increase in percentage of 401(k) contributions allocated to company stock. In addition, controlling for other firm characteristics, employees of firms that advertise more heavily invest significantly more in company stock, while union employees and hourly workers invest significantly less in company stock. As well, increases in the length of current CEO tenure significantly increase employee allocations into company stock by employees, while CEO departures from a firm significantly decrease it.
There are two paths of further research on loyalty in investment. The first is deciphering the mechanism loyalty plays in individual choice. Loyalty could be effecting individuals' judgements through a direct increase in utility, or through a bias in probability forecasts (or both). Although the two may make observationally equivalent predictions in some contexts, they are important to distinguish between because policy implications for dealing with loyalty effects caused by the two can be drastically different. The second is identifying additional situations in which loyalty is likely to play a strong role in the individual's investment decision. For instance, Morse and Shive (2003) , in research on the home bias, find that loyalty to country plays an important role in investment allocation. Specifically, they find that countries that are more patriotic have a more severe home bias in equity portfolio formation. Loyalty in investment, though, need not be constrained to equity portfolio decisions. Managerial decision making with respect to labor choice, where to locate investment capital, and from what institutions to seek financing, are all decisions in which loyalty may play a substantial role.
A Data Appendix
The main data used in this paper are employee withholdings of income into company owned retirement plans. The plans qualify under Section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code ("401(k) plans"), and in addition, the data are selected from those companies that give employees the option of investing in own company stock. Most of the firms that offer company stock in their 401(k) plan must file annual reports with the SEC, called Form 11-k filings 36 . The main criteria of whether a plan must file a report is whether its interests constitute "securities 37 ." A simple way to identify this is that firms having plans that issue new shares of company stock to fund the plan, must file a Form 11-k 38 .
I will be using four types of 11-k contributions: employee total discretionary contributions, employee discretionary contributions in company stock, total plan assets, and company stock in plan assets. The first two can be thought of as yearly flow variables, and the second two as accumulations. They are best illustrated in the following example (the example will also include the two different forms of company match). Consider an employee participating in year 5 of the retirement plan of company A. The plan offers three investment options: company stock, an S&P 500 Fund, and a T-Bill Fund. The participant chooses to defer 100 of income into the plan, investing 40 in the S&P 500 Fund, 40 in the T-Bill Fund, and 20 in company A stock. The employee's discretionary contribution to company stock and total discretionary contributions for year 5 are then 20 and 100, respectively. Assume that the company match for year 5 is 10. If the match is in company stock, then all 10 is invested in company A stock. If the match follows participant contributions, then 4 is invested in the S&P 500 Fund, 4 in the T-Bill Fund, and 2 in company A stock. In either case, the accumulation and appreciation (depreciation) of the investments of both employees and the company over the life of the plan is total plan assets. In this example, assuming that there is only one employee of the company, the plan assets at year 5 may be, for example, 400, with company stock in plan assets being, for instance, 100. Panel B: This table is a summary of employee characteristics. Data was collected on the number of plan participants (active and inactive) for a subset of firms using the Department of Labor's Form 5500 Tapes. The percent of income deferred by employees is estimated using (total company contribution/total employee contribution) for a given year and the Maximum Total Match of a company, and so is an upper bound of income contribution percentage by employees. The last two measures Total Annual Contribution/Total Plan Assets and Active Participants/Total Participants are both proxies for the number of years that the retirement plan has been offered (plan age). The dependent variable in the regressions is percentage of employee discretionary contributions in company stock. The independent variable of interest in the regressions is Stand Alone-Congl, a categorical variable indicating the firm type of stand alone or conglomerate. It is equal to 1 if the company is a stand alone firm, and 0 if the company is a conglomerate. Also included in the regressions are the firm characteristics of natural logarithm of market equity and book-to-market equity, ln(ME) and ln(B/M). In addition, where indicated, the beta and standard deviation of monthly returns for each firm are included. These characteristics are estimated at the 12 month (Beta12 and St Dev12), 24 month (Beta24 and St Dev24), and 36 month (Beta36 and St Dev36) time horizon. The natural logarithm of a proxy for wage is included, ln(Wages). Wages are measured as the average of the seasonally adjusted real industry wage (deflated to 1983 dollars) over the past 10 year period. Com Match is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the company matches in company stock and zero otherwise. Industry fixed effects are at the 4 digit SIC code level. The sample period is 1997-2000, and year fixed effects are also included where indicated. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level. t-statistics calculated using the clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Table 4 : Allocation Determinants -Excessive Extrapolation
The dependent variable in the regressions is percentage of employee discretionary contributions in company stock. The independent variable of interest in the regressions is Stand Alone-Congl, a categorical variable indicating the firm type of stand alone or conglomerate. It is equal to 1 if the company is a stand alone firm, and 0 if the company is a conglomerate. Also included in the regressions are the firm characteristics of natural logarithm of market equity and book-to-market equity, ln(ME) and ln(B/M). The natural logarithm of a proxy for wage is included, ln(Wages). Wages are measured as the average of the seasonally adjusted real industry wage (deflated to 1983 dollars) over the past 10 year period. Com Match is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the company matches in company stock and zero otherwise. Past returns of 1-, 5-, and 10-years are included. The sample period is 1997-2000, and both year fixed effects and industry fixed effects at the 2 digit SIC code level are included in all regressions. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level. t-statistics calculated using the clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable in the regressions is percentage of employee discretionary contributions in company stock. The first independent variable in the regressions is number of firm business segments as reported in COMPUSTAT segment database. The remainder of the diversification measures are firm Herfindahl Indices based on the segment measures of Employees, Sales, Assets, and Capital Expenditures. These Herfindahl Indices will be equal to 1 for stand alone firms, and will approach 0 as firms become more and more diversified. Also included in the regression are the firm characteristics of natural logarithm of market equity and book-to-market equity, ln(ME) and ln(BE/ME). The natural logarithm of a proxy for wage is included, ln(wage). Wage is measured as the average of the seasonally adjusted real industry wage (deflated to 1983 dollars) over the past 10 year period. Com Match is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the company matches in company stock and zero otherwise. 1-year past returns are also included. The sample period is 1997-2000, and both year fixed effects and industry fixed effects at the 2 digit SIC code level are included in all regressions. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level. t-statistics calculated using the clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Panel A: This panel presents tests of the information-based hypothesis. The first column measures the ability of investors to predict one year ahead returns. This is measured by the correlation between percentage change in prices for a given year and the percentage change in the portion of discretionary contributions invested in company stock during the prior year. The second column measures the ability of investors to predict returns using short term information. Short term information is information that must be traded on relatively quickly, within a given year. This is measured using the correlation between change in prices for a given year and change in discretionary contributions for the same year. Panel B: The dependent variable in the regressions is percentage of employee discretionary contributions in company stock. Geographic familiarity is measured by Domestic Exposure. Domestic Exposure is constructed as the ratio of sales in domestic segments to total sales by all geographic segments. The diversification measures are: Stand Alone-Congl, a categorical variable equal to 1 for the firm type of stand alone and 0 for a conglomerate, Segments, the number of business segments reported, and a Herfindahl index based on segments net sales (equal to 1 for stand alone, approaches zero as firm becomes more diversified). All measures are constructed using COMPUSTAT Industrial Segments database. Also included in the regression are the firm characteristics of natural logarithm of market equity and book-to-market equity, ln(ME) and ln(BE/ME). The natural logarithm of a proxy for wage is included, ln(wage). Wage is measured as the average of the seasonally adjusted real industry wage (deflated to 1983 dollars) over the past 10 year period. Com Match is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the company matches in company stock and zero otherwise. 1-year past returns are also included. Industry fixed effects are included at the 4 digit SIC code level. The sample period is 1997-2000, and year fixed effects are also included (neither is reported below). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level. This table shows the effects of a spin-off on the percentage invested in own company stock by employees. The percentage in own company stock for the parent firm is calculated using the ending year balances from form 11-k for the year prior to the spin-off. The percentage in own company stock for the spun-off firm is calculated using the 11-k ending year balance from the year of spin-off, and dependent on the number of months included in the initial spin-off year, also using the year following the spin-off. The spin-off data was provided by Spin-off Advisors, LLC. The dependent variable in the regressions is percentage of employee discretionary contributions in company stock. The three independent variables of interest are Advertising, Union, and Transient. Advertising measures the advertising expense of firms. Union is a categorical variable equal to 1 for plans covering solely union workers, and 0 for all other plans. Transient is a categorical variable equal to 1 for plans covering solely hourly workers, and 0 for all other plans. The independent variable Stand Alone-Congl is a categorical variable indicating the firm type of stand alone or conglomerate. It is equal to 1 if the company is a stand alone firm, and 0 if the company is a conglomerate. Sales Herfindahl is a Herfindahl index based on segments net sales (equal to 1 for stand alone, approaches zero as firm becomes more diversified). Also included in the regression are the firm characteristics of natural logarithm of market equity and book-to-market equity, ln(ME) and ln(BE/ME). The natural logarithm of a proxy for wage is included, ln(wage). Wage is measured as the average of the seasonally adjusted real industry wage (deflated to 1983 dollars) over the past 10 year period. Com Match is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the company matches in company stock and zero otherwise. The sample period is 1997-2000, and both year fixed effects and industry fixed effects at the 1 digit SIC code level are included in all regressions. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level. t-statistics calculated using the clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. The dependent variable in the regressions is percentage of employee discretionary contributions in company stock. The two independent variables of interest are CEO Tenure and Company Tenure. CEO Tenure is a measure of the number of years the current CEO has been in office. Company Tenure is a measure of the number of years the current CEO has been with the company. Data on both CEO measures is obtained from COMPUSTAT Execucomp database. The independent variable Stand Alone-Congl is a categorical variable indicating the firm type of stand alone or conglomerate. It is equal to 1 if the company is a stand alone firm, and 0 if the company is a conglomerate. Segments is a measure of the number of segments in the firm. Also included in the regression are the firm characteristics of natural logarithm of market equity and book-to-market equity, ln(ME) and ln(BE/ME). The natural logarithm of a proxy for wage is included, ln(wage). Wage is measured as the average of the seasonally adjusted real industry wage (deflated to 1983 dollars) over the past 10 year period. Com Match is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the company matches in company stock and zero otherwise. The sample period is 1997-2000, and both year fixed effects and industry fixed effects at the 1 digit SIC code level are included in all regressions. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level. t-statistics calculated using the clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
